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1. Introduction 
Much of the philosophical literature on causation has focused on the concept of ‗actual‘ 
causation, sometimes called ‗token‘ causation. In particular, it is this notion of actual 
causation that many philosophical theories of causation have attempted to capture.
2
 In 
this paper, we address the question: what purpose does this concept serve? As we shall 
see in the next section, one does not need this concept for purposes of prediction or 
rational deliberation. What then could the purpose be?  We will argue that one can gain 
                                                 
1
 We would like to thank Nancy Cartwright, Clark Glymour, Alison Gopnik, Dennis 
Hilton, Christoph Hoerl, David Lagnado, Tania Lombrozo, David Mandel, Laurie Paul, 
Jonathan Schaffer, Jim Woodward, Gideon Yaffe and audience members at the 
McDonnell workshop on Causal and Moral Cognition (California Institute of 
Technology), the University of Southern California, the workshop on the Origins and 
Functions of Causal Thinking IV (Venice, Italy), Rutgers University, the Society for 
Philosophy and Psychology (Toronto), the Workshop on Causal and Counterfactual 
Understanding (University of Warwick), and the Workshop on Counterfactuals (Erasmus 
University Rotterdam). 
2
 For example, Armstrong (2004), Barker (2004), Björnsson (2007), Davidson (1980), 
Dowe (2000), Eells (1001. Chapter 6), Ehring (1997), Ganeri, Noordhof and 
Ramachandran (1996, 1998), Glymour and Wimberly (2007), Hall (2007), Halpern and 
Pearl (2005), Hiddleston (2005), Hitchcock (2001, 2004, 2007a), Kvart (1997), Lewis 
(1973/1986, 1986a, 2000), McDermott (1995), Menzies (1989, 1996, 2004a, 2004b), 
Noordhof (1999, 2004), Pearl (2000, chapter 10), Ramachandran (1997, 1998, 2004a, 
2004b), Schaffer (2001), Tooley (1987), Woodward (2003, chapter 2) and Yablo (2002, 
2004). 
  3 
an important clue here by looking at the ways in which causal judgments are shaped by 
people‘s understanding of norms. 
 
2. The problem 
We may illustrate the concept of actual causation with a simple example: 
 
Assassin and Backup set off on a mission to poison Victim. Assassin puts poison 
in Victim‘s drink. Backup stands at the ready; if Assassin hadn‘t poisoned the 
drink, Backup would have. Both poisons are lethal. Victim drinks the poison and 
dies. 
 
This is an example of causal preemption: Assassin‘s action causes Victim‘s death, and 
also preempts Backup‘s action, which would have caused the death if Assassin had not 
acted. Cases of causal preemption have received a lot of attention, since they provide 
problems for both regularity and counterfactual theories of causation. Backup‘s presence, 
plus his willingness to use the poison, together with the composition of the poison, 
Victim‘s thirst, and other factors, are nomically sufficient for Victim‘s death without the 
need to mention Assassin; nonetheless, Backup is not a cause of Victim‘s death. And 
Victim‘s death would have occurred even if Assassin had not acted; nonetheless, 
Assassin‘s action is a cause of Victim‘s death. 
Our little story has a causal structure, which can be represented abstractly using a 
neuron diagram (fig. 1) or a system of structural equations as follows: 
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AS = 1 
BS = 1 
AP = AS 
BP = BS & ~AP 
PD = AP  BP 
VD = PD 
 
(Where AS represents ‗Assassin sets off‘, BS ‗Backup sets off‘, AP ‗Assassin poisons the 
drink‘, BP ‗Backup poisons the drink‘, PD ‗The drink is poisoned‘, and VD ‗Victim 
dies‘.) These representations tell us how each event in the story depends upon the other 
events in the story. For example, they tell us that Backup would have poisoned the drink 
just in case he set off, and Assassin hadn‘t poisoned the drink. Note that there is nothing 
inherently general or universal about the causal structure. For example, the last equation 
only tells us that in this particular case, Victim would have died if his drink had been 
poisoned, and would not have died if it had not been poisoned. It does not say that 
poisonings always, or even typically, cause deaths.
3
 
 Over and above this causal structure, however, we have the judgment that 
Assassin‘s actions caused Victim to die, while Backup‘s actions did not. This is a 
judgment about actual causation. We wish to ask what the purpose of such a judgment is. 
In particular, why don‘t we make do with just the causal structure? After all, the causal 
structure suffices to allow us to make predictions about what will happen, given any 
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combination of the relevant causal antecedents. The causal structure allows us to infer 
what would happen if we were to interfere with the system to disrupt the causal 
relationships in various ways. And the causal structure allows us to answer any 
counterfactual questions about how things might have gone differently. What more could 
we want from knowledge of causation? 
We may approach this problem from a slightly different direction. There have 
been a number of attempts to extend the counterfactual theory of causation to 
accommodate cases of causal preemption. One promising line, realized in somewhat 
different ways by Lewis (1986), Halpern and Pearl (2005), Hall (2007), and Hitchcock 
(2007), is to identify causation not with counterfactual dependence in the actual situation, 
but rather with counterfactual dependence in a certain kind of ‗normalized‘ version of the 
actual situation. This normalized situation is reached by replacing abnormal features of 
the actual situation with more normal alternatives. Thus in our little causal story, while 
Victim‘s death does not counterfactually depend upon Assassin‘s action in the actual 
situation described, it would depend upon Assassin‘s action in the normalized version of 
the situation where Backup is not present. This is a rough sketch only; the details need 
not detain us. The question that arises is: what purpose can be served by a concept that 
has these contours? What purpose can be served by identifying factors that would have 
made a difference, not in the actual situation, but in a modified version of the actual 
situation? 
 
3. Solution sketch 
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Before we begin examining the purpose of the concept of actual causation, it might be 
helpful to consider one popular view about the purpose of the concept of causal structure.  
Several authors have championed the view that the purpose of understanding causal 
structure is to predict the outcomes of interventions (e.g., Cartwright 1979; Woodward 
2003).  In particular, it has been suggested that the key difference between knowing 
causal structure and merely knowing facts about correlations is that the former type of 
knowledge can enable people to predict the outcomes of intervention in a way that the 
latter cannot.    
To see the distinctive role of the concept of causation here, consider what might 
happen if you discovered a correlation whereby people who are beaten as children tend to 
be more violent as adults.  Just by knowing that correlation, you could predict that a child 
who was beaten would be more likely to later become violent.  Why then would you want 
to know whether there was actually a causal relationship between being beaten and 
becoming violent?  The idea we will be drawing on here is that this information about 
causation proves useful when one‘s goal is not only to predict the results of subsequent 
observations but also to actively intervene in the world.  Hence, in this example, the 
important thing about knowing whether there was a causal relationship here would be 
that this sort of knowledge would allow you to determine whether you could actually 
prevent people from becoming violent in adulthood by intervening to prevent them from 
being beaten as children.   
Our aim here is to construct an account that extends this basic insight, showing 
how people‘s concept of actual causation enables them to design effective interventions. 
In particular, we argue that information that has nothing to do with causal structure can 
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sometimes prove helpful in determining which intervention would be most suitable and 
that people are actually making use of this information in deciding which factors to 
denominate as ‗causes.‘ In general, while causal structure identifies all of the factors that 
could be manipulated (either singly or in combination) to effect a change in the outcome, 
the actual causes are the factors that should be manipulated. 
 For a simple example, consider a student who has just gotten an F on a test and is 
wondering how this outcome might have been avoided.  At least in theory, she might 
consider all sorts of different possibilities: ‗I would not have gotten an F if the teacher 
had been eaten by a lion.‘ ‗I would not have gotten an F if the Earth‘s gravitational pull 
had suddenly decreased.‘ ‗I would not have gotten an F if I had had less to drink the night 
before the test.‘  Yet although all of these different counterfactuals might be correct, she 
is only likely to entertain one of these, and only one of them actually points toward a 
suitable target of intervention.  She should not be wasting her time thinking about the 
possibility of avoiding a bad grade by introducing lions or decreasing the Earth‘s 
gravitational pull.  The thing to focus on here is the possibility of getting a better grade by 
drinking less. 
  It is in addressing problems like this one, we think, that the concept of actual 
causation really earns its keep.  Information about causal structure entails many different 
counterfactuals about how a given outcome might have been avoided.  But people‘s 
judgments of actual causation do something more.  They select, from amongst all of these 
different counterfactuals, a chosen few that might actually be worth considering.  In 
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short, the concept of actual causation enables us to pick out appropriate targets for 
intervention.
4
   
 At this point, it might be helpful to clarify the status of the claim we are making.  
We certainly are not saying that people‘s ordinary criteria for actual causation include 
something like: ‗Pick out the factor that would be the most appropriate target for 
intervention.‘ Nor are we claiming to offer anything like an analysis of actual causation. 
Rather, the significance of questions about targets of intervention only arises when we 
ask a further justificatory question.  Even if we were able to develop a perfect set of 
criteria for actual causation, there would still be a further question, namely, Why deploy a 
concept with just these criteria?  It is here that the notion of identifying suitable targets of 
intervention plays a role.  We will argue that there truly is something of value about the 
criteria people ordinarily use, and the claim will be that this value comes from the fact 
that people‘s ordinary criteria tend to pick out factors that would genuinely be suitable 
targets of intervention.   
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The basic strategy we find here is much like the one at work in interventionist 
theories of causal structure.  As we saw above, the motivating idea behind these accounts 
is that causal relationships, in contrast with spurious correlations for example, can 
support our interventions. But this idea, by itself, is clearly inadequate as an analysis of 
the distinction between causal relationships and mere correlations. For example, there can 
be causal relationships in astrophysics, where human intervention is impossible in 
practice or even in principle. The actual criteria for causation do not themselves make 
any reference to agents trying to achieve goals; instead, they are framed in terms of 
certain technical concepts which need not detain us here (but see, e.g., Woodward 2003, 
chapters 2 and 3).  But then one can still ask why it might make sense to employ a 
concept with these particular criteria.  Here the suggestion is that these criteria make 
sense because they generally enable us to pick out factors that we can manipulate in order 
to achieve particular goals.  The appeal to agency is not part of the analysis of causation, 
but rather helps to explain why we put so much stock in causal knowledge.  
Our approach here has the same basic structure.  First we point to some surprising 
features of the actual criteria governing ascriptions of causation.  Then we suggest that 
these criteria actually make sense if one assumes that causal ascriptions serve a particular 
kind of purpose in our lives.  It is only at this second level that we invoke the idea of 
identifying suitable targets for intervention.   
 
4. Causal Selection 
It has long been recognized that ordinary causal judgments make use of information that 
goes beyond anything that might be included in causal structure. People seem to rely on 
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extra-structural information to select certain candidate causes over others – claiming, e.g., 
that the spark was a ‗cause‘ of the fire, while the oxygen was merely a background 
‗condition.‘ Yet although everyone acknowledges that this process of selection takes 
place, questions about the precise nature of the selection have not figured prominently in 
the existing literature on the concept of causation. Indeed, most authors who have chosen 
to discuss the problem of selection at all have ended up concluding that it serves only to 
distract us from those aspects of causal judgment that are truly philosophically important. 
Thus Mill writes: 
 
It is seldom, if ever, between a consequent and a single antecedent, that this 
invariable sequence subsists. It is usually between a consequent and the sum of 
several antecedents; the concurrence of all of them being requisite to produce, that 
is, to be certain of being followed by, the consequent. In such cases it is very 
common to single out one only of the antecedents under the denomination of 
Cause, calling the others mere Conditions…The real cause, is the whole of these 
antecedents; and we have, philosophically speaking, no right to give the name of 
cause to one of them, exclusively of the others. (Mill 1856, 360 – 1). 
 
Lewis says: 
 
We sometimes single out one among all the causes of some event and call it ‗the‘ 
cause, as if there were no others. Or we single out a few as the ‗causes‘, calling 
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the rest mere ‗causal factors‘ or ‗causal conditions‘… I have nothing to say about 
these principles of invidious discrimination. (Lewis 1973/1986, p. 162) 
 
And Hall adds: 
 
When delineating the causes of some given event, we typically make what are, 
from the present perspective, invidious distinctions, ignoring perfectly good 
causes because they are not sufficiently salient. We say that the lightning bolt 
caused the forest fire, failing to mention the contribution of the oxygen in the air, 
or the presence of a sufficient quantity of flammable material. But in the 
egalitarian sense of ‗cause,‘ a complete inventory of the fire‘s causes must include 
the presence of oxygen and of dry wood. (Hall 2004, 228) 
 
In short, all of these authors agree that our ordinary causal attributions are highly 
selective, but they nonetheless contend that this selectivity is somehow independent of 
the truly deep and important features of the concept of causation. These deep and 
important features, they argue, are entirely ‗egalitarian,‘ i.e., free from the sort of 
selectivity one finds in ordinary causal attributions.  
 We concur that this egalitarianism is entirely appropriate at the level of what we 
have called causal structure.
5
 We claim, however, that it is out of place at the level of 
actual causation. If the concept of actual causation were entirely egalitarian, we find it 
hard to see how it could be helpful for people even to have the concept at all. All of the 
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truly important information would already be contained in the causal structure, and it 
seems that people would be better off ignoring questions of actual causation altogether 
and simply talking about patterns of counterfactual dependence. The value of the concept 
of actual causation, we wish to suggest, comes precisely from the fact that it is 
inegalitarian. Our concept of causation enables us to pick out those factors that are 
particularly suitable as targets of intervention.  
 
5. Norms and causal judgment 
To illustrate the basic issues here, we can introduce a simple case, which we will call the 
pen vignette:   
The receptionist in the philosophy department keeps her desk stocked with 
pens. The administrative assistants are allowed to take pens, but faculty members 
are supposed to buy their own. 
The administrative assistants typically do take the pens. Unfortunately, so 
do the faculty members. The receptionist repeatedly e-mailed them reminders that 
only administrators are allowed to take the pens. 
On Monday morning, one of the administrative assistants encounters 
Professor Smith walking past the receptionist‘s desk. Both take pens. Later, that 
day, the receptionist needs to take an important message…but she has a problem. 
There are no pens left on her desk.  
 
Now, if these events were actually unfolding, there would be a number of different ways 
of intervening to prevent the problem. One approach would be to make the professor do 
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what he was supposed to do and stop violating the rules. Another would be to allow the 
professor to violate the rules but to cancel out some of the effects of his action by making 
the administrative assistant refrain from taking any pens. Either of these two approaches 
would work in the situation as described. And yet, it seems that the two approaches are 
not entirely equal. One has a clear intuition – an intuition we will explore at length below 
– that it would actually be more suitable in some important respect to intervene by 
making the professor obey the rules. 
 The key thing to note now is that people‘s ordinary causal judgments follow this 
same pattern. In one recent experiment, subjects were given the pen vignette and then 
asked whether they agreed or disagreed with one of the following sentences. 
 Professor Smith caused the problem. 
 The administrative assistant caused the problem. 
Overall, subjects agreed with the statement that Professor Smith caused the problem, but 
they disagreed with the statement that the administrative assistant caused the problem 
(Knobe & Fraser 2008).
6
 In other words, the factor that subjects picked out as a ‗cause‘ 
was precisely the factor that seemed most suitable as a target of intervention. 
 This simple example illustrates the basic elements of the account of causal 
judgment we will be developing here. On this account, people‘s causal judgments don‘t 
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simply pick out any old factor that happens to stand in the right position within a causal 
structure. Instead, ordinary causal judgments specifically pick out those factors that 
would prove especially suitable as targets of intervention. It is this selective aspect of 
causal judgments that allows them to have a value that goes beyond anything one might 
find in causal structure alone.  
 Our argument for this account comes in two parts. First we engage in a purely 
descriptive project, trying to understand the pattern of people‘s ordinary causal 
judgments. Then we turn to more explicitly evaluative questions, explaining how the 
pattern evinced in people‘s ordinary judgments might actually prove helpful in selecting 
targets of intervention.   
 
6. Counterfactual Reasoning and Norms 
To arrive a proper understanding of people‘s ordinary causal judgments, we will need to 
turn to a topic that might at first seem unrelated to the issue of causal selection but which, 
we believe, will eventually help us to resolve the problems under discussion here.  In 
particular, we need to turn to questions about the human capacity for counterfactual 
reasoning – the capacity people use for thinking about how things might have been 
different from the way they actually are.  
 Our concern here will not be with the aspects of counterfactual reasoning that 
usually come up in discussions of topics like this one. We will not be asking about the 
semantics of counterfactuals or about how people determine whether certain 
counterfactuals are true or false. Instead, we will be concerned with questions about how 
people decide which counterfactuals are worth thinking about in the first place. Or, to put 
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it in the terms we will be using here, our concern is with questions about how people 
decide which counterfactuals are relevant. These questions have not played much of a 
role in the philosophical literature thus far, but they have been investigated in great depth 
within cognitive and social psychology (Byrne 2002; Kahneman & Miller 1986; 
Kahneman & Tversky 1982; Mandel et al. 2005; Roese 1997), and quite a bit is now 
known about the ways in which people determine whether or not a given counterfactual is 
relevant.    
For an example of the phenomenon under discussion here, consider what might 
happen if we submitted a manuscript to a journal and it ended up being sent to a reviewer 
who held certain bizarre and idiosyncratic views.  To make the case more concrete, let us 
suppose that the reviewer has a strong distaste for the word ‗and‘ and that he therefore 
rejects our paper on the grounds that one should never use that word more than three 
times per page.
7
 It seems that we would then treat as relevant counterfactuals of the form: 
(1) If the manuscript had been sent to a reviewer with more ordinary views… 
Thoughts about this sort of counterfactual would leap immediately to our minds; we 
might even be unable to keep ourselves from thinking about them. By contrast, we would 
probably treat as completely irrelevant counterfactuals of the form: 
(2) If the reviewer had composed a catchy pop song about our manuscript… 
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Of course, people are not literally incapable of thinking about irrelevant counterfactuals 
like this one.  (If pressed, they could imagine the counterfactual situation and do their 
best to figure out what outcomes would result.)  Still, there is an almost overwhelming 
tendency for people not to think in any way about such things. Our capacity for 
counterfactual reasoning seems to show a strong resistance to any consideration of 
irrelevant counterfactuals. 
Ultimately, our aim is to show that certain facts about the way people assess the 
relevance of counterfactuals can explain the puzzling patterns we observed earlier in 
looking at the nature of causal selection.  That is, we want to show that the criteria people 
use when assessing relevance can be used to explain how people manage to pick out the 
most suitable targets of intervention. For the moment, however, we want to put aside 
these broader issues about the relationship between causation and moral judgment and 
simply focus on developing a theory about how people assess the relevance of 
counterfactuals.   
At the heart of our theory is the idea that people's judgments about the relevance 
of counterfactuals depend in an essential way on norms.  The basic suggestion is that 
people classify events on a scale from ‗normal‘ to ‗abnormal.‘  Then, when something 
abnormal occurs, they regard as relevant counterfactuals that involve something more 
normal having occurred instead.  Roughly speaking, the reason why people think that 
counterfactual (1) is relevant is that they think it is normal for philosophy papers to be 
given to reviewers who do not evaluate papers based on the frequency of an innocuous 
conjunction.  Conversely, the reason people regard counterfactual (2) as irrelevant is that 
they think it is abnormal for reviewers to write catchy pop songs about the manuscripts 
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they receive.  And similarly for numerous other sorts of cases.  The basic picture here is 
one in which, whenever something abnormal occurs, people show a tendency to think 
about how things would have gone if something normal had taken place instead. By 
contrast, people are much less inclined to entertain counterfactual hypotheses in which 
normal events are replaced by abnormal ones. 
At this point, however, it may be thought that our account suffers from a 
fundamental ambiguity.  For it might be suggested that terms like 'norm' and 'normal' can 
be used in a number of distinct senses.  Indeed, one might say that there are at least two 
completely separate meanings at work here.  
 First, there are what one might call ‗statistical norms.‘ These norms simply 
capture information about the relative frequencies of certain events. Using the word 
‗norm‘ in this sense, one might say, e.g.: ‗The temperature yesterday was considerably 
colder than the norm for this time of year.‘  
 Second, there are ‗prescriptive norms‘ – norms that actually tell us what ought to 
happen under certain circumstances. Using ‗norm‘ in this latter sense, one might say: 
‗There is a strong norm in our community against interrupting during someone‘s talk.‘ 
Moreover, there seem to be different kinds of prescriptive norms. There are purely moral 
norms, where violating the norm would be intrinsically wrong. Then there are legal 
norms, or more generally norms arising from policies adopted by social institutions. 
Professor Smith violated such a norm when he took one of the last pens. Often there is 
nothing intrinsically wrong with an action that violates such a norm, although the 
presence of the policy (if just and conducive toward some social good) might create a 
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moral obligation to adhere to it. There are also norms of proper functioning that apply to 
artifacts and biological organisms (and their components).  
 In light of these distinctions, it might be thought that we need to say which 
specific type of norm ends up playing a role in the way people assess the relevance of 
counterfactuals.  Yet although there clearly are differences between these kinds of norms, 
it also seems that it is not merely a sort of pun that they have come to be denoted by the 
same word. There really does seem to be some important way in which these different 
kinds of norms are connected in our ordinary ways of understanding the world. Hence, 
when we say of a person that she is ‗abnormal,‘ we do not typically have in mind either a 
purely statistical judgment or a purely prescriptive one. Instead, we seem to be making a 
single overall judgment that takes both statistical and prescriptive considerations into 
account.  
 Perhaps the connection we see here between statistical and prescriptive norms 
stems from the fact that people can use each of these norms as a heuristic for the other.  
On the one hand, when we are trying to figure out what people are going to do, we 
sometimes rely on the assumption that they will probably end up choosing the option that 
is best.  On the other, when we are wondering whether a given option is a bad one, we 
sometimes proceed by assuming that an option is unlikely to be very bad if it is 
frequently chosen. Given the close connection between these two kinds of judgments, 
people may have developed a single type of representation that is not specifically 
designed either for statistical purposes or for prescriptive purposes but which manages to 
do a fairly decent job in both domains.  To take just one example, it seems that people 
sometimes develop ‗scripts‘ for stereotypical situations and that, although these scripts do 
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not perfectly capture either the statistical distribution of behaviors in those situations or 
the prescriptively optimal behaviors to perform, they do help people to get a rough sort of 
handle on both of these issues.    
 In keeping with this general idea, our theory does not assign distinct roles to 
statistical and prescriptive norms. The claim is rather that people classify each 
counterfactual as having a single overall degree of ‗normality‘ (taking both statistical and 
prescriptive considerations into account) and that this overall degree of normality ends up 
affecting people‘s sense of whether the counterfactual is relevant or irrelevant.  
 With this framework in place, we can return to the example discussed above. The 
suggestion would be that people develop an overall conception of what sorts of criteria 
for evaluating a paper would be ‗normal‘ for a reviewer to apply.  This conception 
integrates both statistical and prescriptive considerations – picking out a particular class 
of criteria in a way that generally steers clear of those that are infrequent (the statistical 
considerations) but also, so far as possible, steers clear of criteria that are not appropriate 
for evaluating philosophy papers (the prescriptive considerations).  People‘s 
counterfactual reasoning then gravitates toward thoughts of reviewers who apply criteria 
that are normal in this sense. Thus, when the actual reviewer‘s views are abnormal, 
people tend to think about what would have happened if they had been more normal. 
 Looking through the psychological literature, one finds a number of different 
hypotheses about precisely how this reasoning process takes place (e.g., Kahneman & 
Miller 1986; Roese 1997), but the precise details of these hypotheses will not be 
important here. The key point for present purposes is just that, whatever else might be 
going on, people do generally show a tendency to direct their counterfactual thoughts 
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toward ways in which the world could have been more normal – and there is considerable 
empirical support for this general claim. To take a case involving prescriptive norms: 
Read (1985) presented subjects with a vignette in which two people are playing cards. 
One person wins the hand, and subjects are invited to complete the sentence ―The 
outcome would have been different if…‖. Subjects were much more strongly inclined to 
strengthen the losing hand than to weaken the winning hand.. Or, for a case involving 
statistical norms: Kahneman and Tversky (1982) presented subjects with a vignette in 
which Mr. Jones was killed in a traffic accident on the way home from work when he was 
hit by drug-crazed truck-driving teenager who ran a red light. In one version of the story, 
Mr. Jones left home from work early in order to run some errands; in another version, he 
deviated from his normal route home in order to enjoy the scenic drive along the lake. 
Subjects were informed of both possibilities; for example, subjects who were given the 
first version of the story were also told that Mr. Jones occasionally took a scenic route 
home, but that he took his normal route home that day. Subjects were then told that 
Jones‘ family and friends often found themselves thinking ―if only…‖; the subjects were 
then told to complete the ―if only…‖ statements. Those subjects who were given the first 
version of the story were strongly inclined to say ―if only Jones had left at his regular 
time‖, rather than ―if only Jones had taken the scenic route‖; whereas subjects who were 
given the second version of the story were inclined to say ―if only Jones had taken his 
regular route home‖ rather than ―if only Jones had left early to run errands.‖ And there 
are numerous further studies showing the same basic effect.  
 
7. Evaluating the Criteria for Counterfactual Relevance 
  21 
Moreover, when one examines these phenomena from a more evaluative perspective, one 
sees immediately that they really do make a certain amount of sense. It‘s not just that our 
minds are constructed in such a way that we tend to think about what would have 
happened if the reviewer had applied more ordinary criteria – it truly is helpful to think 
about counterfactual scenarios like that one. Similarly, it‘s not just that people happen not 
to think about what would have occurred if the reviewer had decided to write a pop song 
– it truly would be pointless to waste one‘s time on thoughts like that one. The best way 
to see why this is so is to look separately at the significance of statistical norms and 
prescriptive norms. In both cases, however, the key points will be remarkably 
straightforward.  
 The reason why it is helpful to think about possibilities that are statistically 
frequent is that these possibilities are the ones that we are most likely to encounter in the 
future.  In one particular instance, we may happen to encounter a highly unusual sort of 
situation, but it would be a mistake in such cases simply to focus on the details of what 
actually ended up occurring.  If we want to plan adequately for the future, we need also to 
think about what would have happened if a more probable type of situation had arisen. 
 The reason why it is helpful to think about possibilities in which prescriptive 
norms are not violated is that those are typically the possibilities we are trying to bring 
about.  If we are trying, e.g., to find some way to avoid a particular outcome, we do not 
want to search for just any way of avoiding that outcome.  Rather, we want to find a way 
of avoiding the outcome without also having something else go wrong. (Moreover, when 
we do not have accurate statistical information available, we use conformity to a 
prescriptive norm as a heuristically useful surrogate.) 
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All in all, then, it seems fairly easy to see how it might be helpful for people to 
engage in counterfactual reasoning in the way they do. What we want to show now is that 
people‘s tendency to consider certain counterfactuals rather than others can actually 
explain the puzzling patterns we find in their causal intuitions.  
  
8. Causal Judgments and Relevant Counterfactuals 
Since the publication of Lewis‘s ―Causation‖ (Lewis 1973/1986), there has been a long 
tradition of trying to analyze causation in terms of counterfactuals. Such accounts run 
into problems with cases of causal preemption, of the sort we saw in section 2 above. 
Many ingenious proposals have been offered to deal with these problems, but the details 
need not concern us here. It seems clear that causation and counterfactuals are closely 
related, and that in most ordinary cases, counterfactual dependence provides a pretty 
good prima facie criterion for causation. Counterfactual dependence is, for example, used 
as a test for causation in the law; and psychologists such as Kahneman and Tversky 
(1982) have argued that we rely on counterfactual reasoning when making causal 
judgments Thus it would hardly be surprising if the same factors that influence 
counterfactual reasoning also affect our causal attributions. 
 Our proposal is that when subjects think about the cause(s) of some event, they 
think about one event, or perhaps a small handful of events, that made a difference for the 
outcome, in the sense that hypothetical situations in which that event does not occur or in 
which it is dramatically different will be ones in which the outcome is dramatically 
different. When people select which events to hypothetically change, they are guided by 
the relevance of the corresponding counterfactual. If some abnormal event occurred, the 
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hypothetical situation in which it does not occur, or some more normal event occurs 
instead, will typically be considered relevant. If this situation is one in which the outcome 
in question is substantially different, the abnormal event will be judged to be a cause of 
that outcome. By contrast, if some normal event occurs, we may never get around to 
considering the counterfactual situation in which some more abnormal alternative occurs 
instead. Even if this situation is one in which the outcome is different, the normal event 
will not be judged a cause of the outcome. Thus, in the pen vignette, while it is true that 
the problem would not have occurred if the administrative assistant had not taken a pen, 
this counterfactual is not deemed as relevant as the one in which Professor Smith does 
not take a pen. This explains why we are less inclined to judge that the administrative 
assistant‘s action was a cause of the problem.  
 Note that normality and abnormality are, at least to some extent, comparative 
notions. Thus even if the administrative assistants and the faculty members only 
infrequently take the pens, still, the administrative assistant‘s taking the pen is more 
normal than Professor Smith‘s doing so, and we are not likely to consider the possibility 
in which she does not take the pen.
8
  
 In the egalitarian tradition illustrated by the passages from Mill, Lewis, and Hall 
above, both the administrative assistant‘s action and Professor Smith‘s action would 
count as causes of the problem. Moreover, they are each full causes: causes do not come 
                                                 
8
 We may make an analogy here with Lewis‘s account of causation as influence (Lewis 
2000). In that account, it is not the absolute amount of influence that one event has over 
another that determines whether it is a cause, but the amount of influence it has in 
comparison with other candidate causes. 
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in degrees. But the ordinary causal judgments of subjects – even, as we shall see, those of 
trained philosophers – are not like this. Subjects are happy to rate their level of agreement 
with the causal claims using non-extreme values of a numerical scale. And to some extent 
at least, they tend to see the two causal claims as being in competition with one another. 
Even when subjects were not asked to explicitly compare the two causal claims, but only 
to rate their agreement with the claim that the administrative assistant caused the 
problem, the presence of a better causal candidate led them to disagree with this claim.  
 
9. Alternative Explanations 
Before going any further, perhaps it will be helpful to sum up the path of the argument 
thus far. We began by asking what purpose people‘s concept of actual causation might 
serve. To address that question, we engaged in an empirical investigation into the criteria 
underlying people‘s ordinary application of this concept. There, we argued that people‘s 
criteria for causal selection arise in part because of the way in which their judgments of 
counterfactual relevance are affected by norms.  Ultimately, our aim is to figure out 
whether the criteria revealed by this empirical inquiry actually do serve a legitimate 
purpose. 
But first we need to consider a certain sort of alternative explanation. On this 
alternative explanation, judgments about norm violation do not actually play any role in 
people‘s underlying competence, but people‘s causal judgments can sometimes be 
distorted by their judgments of blame. It is possible, for instance, that subjects are 
conflating the questions of causation and blame. Or perhaps subjects recognize that while 
it is strictly true that the administrative assistant caused the problem, it would be 
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infelicitous to say so, since the context suggests that the causal inquiry is being made for 
the purpose of assigning blame (Driver 2008). Or perhaps we have an immediate negative 
affective reaction to Professor Smith‘s action, which biases us in favor of causal 
assessments that will underwrite attributions of blame to him (Alicke 1992). 
Although these alternative explanations can accommodate all of the data we have 
discussed thus far, they rely on a type of moral judgment that plays no role at all in our 
preferred account. In the pen vignette, for example, one finds two different events about 
which people could be making moral judgments:  
Candidate cause: Professor Smith taking a pen 
Effect: The problem arising 
The alternative explanations suggest that people‘s causal judgments are influenced by a 
moral judgment they make about the effect – namely, a judgment that the professor is to 
blame for the problem. By contrast, our own account makes no mention of any sort of 
moral judgment regarding the effect. Instead, it posits a role for judgments about whether 
the candidate cause was itself a norm violation. 
These various approaches all yield exactly the same prediction in the pen vignette, 
but it should be possible to develop vignettes in which the different approaches yield very 
different predictions. What we need now are cases in which a norm is violated but no one 
is assigned blame. In cases of this latter type, the alternative explanations suggest that 
moral considerations should have no impact on people‘s causal judgments (because of the 
absence of blame) while our own hypothesis suggests that the impact of  normative 
considerations should remain unchanged (because people still see that a norm has been 
violated). 
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To decide between these competing views, we conducted a questionnaire study. 
Overall, the study had 3,422 subjects, including 327 who indicated that they were 
philosophy professors or had Ph.D.s in philosophy. Each subject received eleven 
vignettes, but only two of those vignettes were relevant to the issue under discussion 
here. (For a full description of the study procedures and the additional vignettes, see 
Hitchcock & Knobe MS.) 
One vignette – the drug vignette – concerned an agent who violates a norm but 
ends up bringing about an outcome that is actually good: 
An intern is taking care of a patient in a hospital.  The intern notices that 
the patient is having some kidney problems.  Recently, the intern read a series of 
studies about a new drug that can alleviate problems like this one, and he decides 
to administer the drug in this case.   
Before the intern can administer the drug, he needs to get the signature of 
the pharmacist (to confirm that the hospital has enough in stock) and the signature 
of the attending doctor (to confirm that the drug is appropriate for this patient).  
So he sends off requests to both the pharmacist and the attending doctor.   
The pharmacist receives the request, checks to see that they have enough 
in stock, and immediately signs off.   
The attending doctor receives the request at the same time and 
immediately realizes that there are strong reasons to refuse. Although some 
studies show that the drug can help people with kidney problems, there are also a 
number of studies showing that the drug can have very dangerous side effects.  
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For this reason, the hospital has a policy forbidding the use of this drug for kidney 
problems. Despite this policy, the doctor decides to sign off. 
Since both signatures were received, the patient is administered the drug.  
As it happens, the patient immediately recovers, and the drug has no adverse 
effects. 
 
After reading this vignette, subjects were asked to rate their agreement or disagreement 
with one of the following two statements: 
 The pharmacist‘s decision caused the patient‘s recovery. 
 The attending doctor‘s decision caused the patient‘s recovery. 
Here the attending doctor is clearly violating a norm, but there is no sense at all in which 
he can be considered blameworthy for the patient‘s recovery. (After all, the patient‘s 
recovery is something good, and there can therefore be no question about who is to blame 
for it.) Yet despite the lack of blame, people were more inclined to say that the doctor‘s 
decision caused the recovery than they were to say that the pharmacist‘s decision caused 
the recovery.
9
 This result indicates that people‘s causal intuitions can be affected by norm 
violations, even in the absence of any judgment of blameworthiness. 
                                                 
9
 Subjects rated each statement on a scale from 1 (‗disagree‘) to 7 (‗agree‘). Overall, the 
statement about the attending doctor received a mean rating of 3.9; the statement about 
the pharmacist received a mean rating of 2.5. This difference was statistically significant, 
t(3411) = 21.5, p < .001. When one looks only at subjects who are philosophy professors 
or have Ph.D.s in philosophy, one finds the same basic pattern (mean for the attending 
doctor = 5.3, mean for the pharmacist = 3.5, t(325)  = 3.2, p < .005). 
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 A second vignette – the machine vignette – described a case in which a norm is 
violated but there are no agents at all: 
A machine is set up in such a way that it will short circuit if both the black 
wire and the red wire touch the battery at the same time. The machine will not 
short circuit if just one of these wires touches the battery. The black wire is 
designated as the one that is supposed to touch the battery, while the red wire is 
supposed to remain in some other part of the machine.  
One day, the black wire and the red wire both end up touching the battery 
at the same time. There is a short circuit. 
After reading the vignette, subjects were asked to rate their agreement or disagreement 
with one of the following statements: 
 The fact that the red wire touched the battery caused the machine to short 
circuit. 
 The fact that the black wire touched the battery caused the machine to short 
circuit. 
Here again, we have a case of norm violation without blameworthiness. Specifically, it 
seems that the red wire is violating a certain kind of norm, but it also seems clear that no 
one could literally blame the red wire for the short circuit. Nonetheless, people were more 
willing to say that the red wire touching the battery caused the short circuit than they 
were to say that the black wire touching the battery caused the short circuit.
10
  So once 
                                                 
10
 Subjects rated each statement on a scale from 1 (‗disagree‘) to 7 (‗agree‘). Overall, the 
statement about the red wire received a mean rating of 4.9; the statement about the black 
wire received a mean rating of 2.7. This difference was statistically significant, t(3410) = 
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again, it seems that people‘s causal intuitions are being affected by norm violations even 
in the absence of any judgment of blame. In addition, the fact that trained philosophers 
make essentially the same judgments as untutored subjects makes it much less plausible 
that the effect is the result of conflating causal judgments with some other kind of 
judgment. 
 
10. Evaluating the Criteria for Causation 
We have been concerned in these past few sections with purely descriptive questions 
about the criteria governing people‘s ordinary causal judgments.  We began with the 
observation that these criteria seem to be constructed in such a way that events that 
involve norm violations are especially likely to be selected as causes.  We then argued 
that this effect was best understood, not in terms of people‘s judgments of blame, but 
rather in terms of their judgments about the relevance of particular counterfactuals.   
 Now that we have in place a specific hypothesis about the criteria underlying 
people‘s ordinary causal intuitions, we can begin to ask whether these criteria actually 
serve any useful purpose. Do these criteria offer us anything beyond what we could get 
from causal structure alone?  Is there anything helpful about selectively picking out those 
factors that most violate certain norms and referring to them in particular as ‗causes‘? 
When one first hears that norm violations are more likely to be picked out as 
causes, it is natural to assume that the purpose of this mechanism must have something to 
                                                                                                                                                 
30.2, p < .001. When one looks only at subjects who are philosophy professors or have 
Ph.D.s in philosophy, one finds the same basic pattern (mean for the red wire = 5.3, mean 
for the black wire = 3.5, t(325) = 8.4, p < .001). 
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do with picking out the agents who are truly to blame for an outcome.  We think that this 
view is not quite right, for reasons described in the previous section, but we do believe 
that it is headed in more or less the right direction.  One can regard the act of blaming a 
person as one way of intervening on that person‘s behavior and trying to get him or her to 
change.  Indeed, Schlick (1939) attempted to understand all of our moral attributions in 
these broadly utilitarian terms. While Schlick‘s account is widely believed to have been 
discredited, e.g. by Strawson (1962) (but see Vargas, forthcoming), it certainly seems that 
one of the things we are doing when we blame someone is to identify a person whose 
behavior is in need of corrective intervention. What we want to suggest, however, is that 
people‘s criteria for causation are not best understood in terms of this one very specific 
form of intervention.  Instead, these criteria are best understood in terms of the broader 
question as to which strategies of intervention are most worth considering.  So the 
question here is not just ‗Which agent in this situation is to blame?‘ but rather something 
like: ‗Of all the various ways in which one could have prevented this from happening, 
which one is the best one to focus on?‘ 
In the kinds of cases we have been discussing, an outcome has arisen, and it is 
immediately clear that there are a number of different ways in which people could have 
intervened to prevent it.  One obvious strategy in these cases would be to intervene on an 
abnormal aspect of the situation and make it more normal.  But there is also another 
possibility.  One could leave all of the abnormal aspects of the situation in place but then 
intervene to introduce additional abnormalities that prevent the outcome from occurring.  
As far as causal structure is concerned, these two possibilities are entirely symmetric – 
either type of intervention would have successfully prevented the effect.  And yet, 
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interestingly, people‘s ordinary causal intuitions are not perfectly symmetric.  People 
tend to specifically pick out the abnormal factor as a cause, thereby directing attention to 
the possibility of intervening on the abnormal factor rather than on any of the normal 
ones.  
What we want to show now is that this approach to causal selection really does 
make sense.
11
  There truly are good reasons to intervene on the abnormal factors rather 
than on the normal ones.  Indeed, we see at least three distinct reasons here, 
corresponding to different types of norm.   
 
10.1. Statistical Norms.  Suppose that an event has occurred and we are thinking about 
what could have been done to prevent it.  In such a case, we will presumably not be 
satisfied just to find an intervention that happens to work in this one specific situation.  
What we will want is a strategy of intervention that is generalizable – a strategy that 
would be effective not just in this one situation but also in other situations of a roughly 
similar type.   
 The criteria underlying people‘s judgments of actual causation appear to be 
designed in a way that enables them to achieve this objective.  These criteria direct our 
attention away from interventions that work by leaving in place some highly unusual 
aspect of the situation and then capitalizing on it to achieve a particular effect.  Instead, 
                                                 
11
 Note that our concern throughout this section is with evaluative questions about 
whether the criteria serve a legitimate purpose, not with empirical questions about how 
those criteria actually arose.  Nothing in what we say here should be taken as an 
endorsement of the adaptationist claim that the criteria underlying people‘s causal 
judgments actually arose because they serve a legitimate purpose. 
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they direct our attention toward interventions that work by leaving in place the most 
normal aspects of the situation and then changing the abnormal aspects in a way that 
makes them more normal.   
 To illustrate the key issues here, we can return to our example of the reviewer 
who rejects a paper on the grounds that one should never use the word ‗and‘ more than 
three times per page.  Now consider two different strategies one could use if one wanted 
to intervene to prevent this paper from being rejected:  
(a) making sure the paper is sent to a reviewer who does not have these bizarre views 
(b) allowing the paper to be sent to a reviewer with these bizarre views but then 
compensating by introducing an additional abnormality, namely, making sure that 
the paper itself contained a highly unusual absence of uses of the word ‗and.‘   
From the perspective of causal structure, these two strategies of intervention are perfectly 
symmetric – either intervention would be effective in preventing the effect.  Yet there is 
clearly a marked difference in generalizability.  If our goal is to prevent papers from 
getting rejected, it would generally be a good strategy to make sure they are not sent to 
reviewers with bizarre views, while it certainly would not generally be a good strategy to 
make sure that they contain fewer than three uses of the word ‗and‘ per page. This 
difference trades on the abnormality of the reviewer‘s evaluation criteria in the statistical 
sense of ‗abnormal‘. Since one will only infrequently encounter reviewers with such 
idiosyncratic criteria, it does not make sense to tailor one‘s paper to fit those criteria. As 
we noted above, however, prescriptive norms often serve as heuristics when frequency 
information is not readily available; to that extent, it also makes sense to focus on 
interventions that will work in situations that are normal in the prescriptive sense as well.   
  33 
 The thing to notice now is that the criteria underlying ordinary judgments of 
causation are designed in such a way that they direct our attention to strategies of 
intervention that are generalizable in this way. Thus, if someone asked us to explain why 
the paper was rejected, we would not tend to consider counterfactuals that involved 
keeping in place all the abnormal factors and then adding additional abnormalities to 
counteract them. Instead, we would immediately think of counterfactuals that involved 
preventing the outcome by changing the abnormal aspects of the situation in a way that 
made them more normal, and we would therefore answer: ‗The cause of the problem here 
was that the paper was sent to a reviewer with bizarre views.‘ 
 Interestingly, the same line of reasoning will also lead us to focus on abnormal 
features of the situation in the case where the outcome is good, and to be promoted. 
Consider the drug vignette. Suppose that as a result of this episode, the hospital 
administration wanted to encourage the use of the drug to treat kidney problems. Whose 
behavior would they need to encourage? Encouraging the pharmacists to sign off on 
requests to use the drug would have little effect. For one thing, the pharmacists are likely 
to be signing off on such requests already. Furthermore, their doing so is unlikely to 
result in patients being given the drug, since the attending physicians will not, as a rule, 
sign off on such requests. However, if the hospital administrators encourage the attending 
physicians to sign off on requests to use the drug, this will almost certainly result in more 
patients receiving the drug. So once again it makes sense to target the abnormal condition 
for intervention. This is what we do when we identify the attending physician‘s decision 
as a cause of recovery.  
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10.2. Moral Norms. Thus far, we have been considering the importance of picking an 
intervention that will generally prove effective, but there are also aspects of choosing the 
best intervention that are completely independent of this issue of effectiveness.  Suppose, 
e.g., that one comes upon a situation that has certain very good aspects and certain very 
bad ones.  It might turn out that one can prevent a particular effect either by making one 
of the bad aspects better or by making one of the good aspects worse.  In such a case, 
there is a clear sense in which it would be better to intervene by changing the bad aspects 
than by changing the good ones.  Notice, however, that the superiority of this type of 
intervention has nothing to do with its probability of successfully preventing a given 
effect.  Even if two strategies of intervention are precisely equal in the degree to which 
they would successfully prevent a certain type of effect in future cases, we might still 
prefer the strategy that involves changing bad aspects of a situation in ways that make 
them better.  
 The striking thing now is that the criteria underlying people‘s ordinary causal 
judgments are designed in such a way that they tend to pick out precisely these sorts of 
interventions. Experimental results suggest that people's causal judgments truly can be 
influenced by their judgments about goodness and badness.  Thus, one recent experiment 
showed that people who are pro-life and those who are pro-choice actually arrive at 
different causal judgments regarding acts intended to bring about the death of a fetus 
(Cushman, Knobe & Sinnot-Armstong). In a case like this one, it seems clear that 
people's intuitions about causation are being affected by full-blown judgments about 
goodness and badness.  
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Something like this effect may also be at work in the case of some policy norms. 
Consider the pen vignette once again.  There, it would be possible to prevent the problem 
using either of two strategies: 
(a) stopping the professor from doing things he should not do  
(b) allowing the professor to keep doing those things but then inconveniencing the 
administrative assistant in a way that counteracts the professor‘s impact on the 
situation.   
Although both of these strategies of intervention would be perfectly effective, there are 
clear reasons to prefer strategy (a) over strategy (b). The policy forbidding faculty 
members from taking the pens is sufficiently reasonable that we judge that it is wrong for 
Professor Smith to take the pen. And, as we saw above, people‘s intuitive judgments 
specifically pick out the professor as a cause, thereby directing attention toward the 
strategy of intervention that truly would be preferable.   
 
10.3 Norms of Proper Functioning. The considerations raised in the previous section 
apply when the violation of a prescriptive norms is actually 'bad.'  This will not be the 
case in all of the examples we introduced above. While it seems reasonable to suggest 
that the professor who unfairly takes a pen is doing something bad, when it comes to 
cases like an incorrectly placed wire in the machine vignette, it seems odd to use this sort 
of characterization. The position of the wire is not truly bad in any deep sense. The norm 
that it violates is a norm of proper functioning, rather than a moral norm. Some policy 
norms within social institutions might be more naturally assimilated to these kinds of 
norms, rather than moral norms. For example, suppose that a company manufactures very 
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expensive dolls that most families cannot afford. The owners of the company are very 
wealthy and corrupt. The employees within this company are governed by rules that are 
designed for the efficient production of these dolls. We might think that it would not be 
morally wrong for an employee to violate these rules: no innocent people will be 
substantially harmed by the resulting inefficiencies. So the company‘s policies do not 
have the status of moral norms. However, since the policies are conducive to the efficient 
operation of the company, they play much the same role that norms of proper functioning 
do in machines and organisms. The machine vignette shows that these kinds of norms can 
also influence people‘s causal judgments. What we need to show, then, is that these sorts 
of judgments also play a helpful role in selecting strategies of intervention. 
To illustrate the key issues here, we can introduce another example. Imagine a 
factory that is governed by a rule according to which Lauren is supposed to put oil in the 
machines while Jane is not.  Now suppose that Lauren forgets to put oil in the machines 
and it therefore ends up breaking down.  If we wanted to intervene to prevent the 
breakdown, we could adopt either of two possible strategies:  
(a) intervene to make Lauren do what she is supposed to do  
(b) allow Lauren to avoid doing what she is supposed to but then intervene to 
make Jane do the job instead.   
Either of these interventions would be effective in preventing the machine from breaking 
down, but is there some reason for choosing one over the other?  We believe that there is.  
Regardless of whether you think that there is anything bad about Lauren not doing the job 
she is supposed to do, it seems that there are good reasons to prefer an intervention that 
does not introduce additional abnormalities into the system.  Given that the whole 
  37 
production line was set up on the assumption that Jane wouldn‘t be adding oil to the 
machines, we have reason to worry that something else will go wrong if we intervene to 
make her do that job.  Perhaps the problem will be that she is no longer able to work at 
her assigned task, or perhaps it will be that there are now too many people in the room 
with the machines, or perhaps it will be something else entirely. Moreover, consistently 
enforcing one particular set of norms is a very efficient way of achieving the end of a 
well-functioning factory. If Jane and Lauren each do their jobs, it is not necessary for 
them to coordinate their actions, or to have a deep understanding of the machine‘s 
functioning. By contrast, if we allow Lauren put oil in the machine or not, Jane will not 
know whether to put oil in the machine without coordinating with Lauren, or inspecting 
the machine to determine whether it needs oil (something she may not know how to do). 
It definitely does seem that we have good reason to prefer the intervention that restores 
the workings of the factory to precisely the way they were designed.   
And, just as one might expect, subjects who are given the story of Lauren and 
Jane agree with the claim that ‗Lauren caused the machine to break down‘ but disagree 
with the claim that ‗Jane caused the machine to break down‘ (Knobe 2005).12  Here as 
elsewhere, it seems that people‘s causal intuitions are directing their attention toward the 
best strategy of intervention.  
A similar approach can be used to explain subjects‘ judgments in the machine 
vignette. The significance of the norm violation here is not that the red wire is in any way 
                                                 
12
 Thirty-five subjects were given each version of the vignette, and then asked to rank 
their level of agreement with the causal claim on a scale from zero to six. The mean 
rating for Lauren was 3.34, for Jane 0.37 (p < .001).  
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to blame but rather that it is the most suitable target of intervention.. The short circuit 
could be avoided by leaving the red wire in place, and moving the black wire to some 
other part of the machine. But this might introduce new problems. Perhaps the black wire 
does not have the same current capacity as the red wire. In order to restore the machine to 
working order by intervening on the black wire, one would have to know more than just 
the design of the machine; one would need to understand the basic principles of its 
operation. Moreover, if different electricians are working on different parts of the 
machine, they would need to coordinate in order to make sure that only one of the wires 
made contact with the battery. None of this is necessary, however, if the electricians are 
simply instructed to assemble the machine according to its original design.  
 
Looking through these three separate points, one may have a certain inclination to 
complain: ‗These points just don‘t have anything to do with each other – the argument 
here is nothing but a list of three unrelated claims.‘ But one may also have an inclination 
to make precisely the opposite sort of complaint: ‗These points are just repeating each 
other –saying the same sorts of thing in three slightly different ways.‘ Perhaps each of 
these views contains part of the truth. The sense in which our three points are very 
different is that they each appeal to a different type of norm – the first to purely statistical 
norms, the second to norms of goodness and badness, the third to norms of proper 
functioning. The sense in which they are all more or less the same is that they all show 
the same basic structure. In each case, we have argued that it is preferable to choose the 
intervention that works by targeting abnormal aspects of the situation and replacing them 
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with more normal ones. It is this basic structure, we believe, that gives our criteria for 
causal selection their distinctive purpose and value. 
 
11. Concluding Summary 
 We began with the question as to whether the concept of causation could be 
shown to have any legitimate purpose.  In hopes of addressing this question, we 
proceeded in two steps.   
 First, we engaged in a purely descriptive attempt to understand the criteria 
governing people‘s ordinary causal intuitions.  There, we suggested that people‘s causal 
intuitions are determined in part by judgments about the relevance of counterfactuals and 
that judgments of relevance are, in turn, determined in part by the application of norms. 
 Second, we asked whether the criteria uncovered in this first part of our inquiry 
might serve any legitimate purpose.  There, we argued that these criteria do serve a 
purpose – namely, that they are designed in such a way that they tend to direct us toward 
the best strategies of intervention.   
 It should be evident by now that, even if people do a perfect job of following their 
criteria for causal selection, they will not always end up picking out the absolutely 
optimal strategy of intervention.  That, however, is not the point.  The point is that the 
criteria are designed in such a way that they generally tend to direct us toward strategies 
of intervention that would be preferable –  and this, we believe, is ample justification for 
our concept of causation.   
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